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A NEW ERA FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW
AND POLICY: SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING
AND THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
Piers Gooding (Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 294, ISBN-13:
978-1107140745 Hardback)
Reviewed by Michael L. Perlin Esq.

What a pleasure it was to read Piers Gooding’s new book, A New Era for
Mental Health Law and Policy: Supported Decision-Making and the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.1 The book is thoughtful, comprehensive, balanced, and readable. It is exhaustively researched and
left this reader wanting to read even more. Spoiler alert: I am cited multiple
times in the work, but, given the breadth and extent of his other sources, I do
not think that disqualifies me from doing this review.2
The topic of this book is one that is near and dear to me. I have
written about it extensively in the past, have presented on related themes
on all continents (save Antarctica), and I have worked with advocacy
groups around the world seeking to interpret and implement the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), mostly—
but not exclusively—in nations with developing economies. It has always
been a matter of great embarrassment and shame to me that the United
States is not a CRPD ratifier, though I remain hopeful that a differently
Michael L. Perlin, Esq., is an Adjunct Professor at Emory University School of Law, Instructor at
Loyola University New Orleans, Department of Criminology and Justice, Professor Emeritus of Law
and Founding Director of the International Mental Disability Law Reform Project at New York Law
School, and Co-founder of Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates.
1
Cites to this work will be in the “GOODING, at XX” format.
2
The book is so well researched and referenced that it would probably be difficult to find any
reviewer whose works are not mentioned.
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constituted Senate might change that at some point in the future.3 I mention this because some have argued that U.S. citizens should not write or
speak about this Convention because of that fact. I disagree, profoundly,
and hope that by writing and speaking about it more, decision-makers who
may be in a position to aid in the ratification efforts might be reached.
When I first wrote about the CRPD, I was straightforward, characterizing it as “the most revolutionary international human rights document ever created that applies to persons with disabilities,”4 as it firmly
endorsed a social model of disability and reconceptualizes mental health
rights as disability rights—a clear and direct repudiation of the medical
model that traditionally was part and parcel of mental disability law.5
Importantly, Dr. Gooding has a slightly different take on the topic,
persuasively arguing that a “human rights” model of disability offers
an even “more comprehensive framework for achieving social justice.”6
The entire book needs to be read through this lens and, I think, the entire
discussion about the CRPD needs to be read through that same lens.
Mental health law is at a crossroads, he says,7 and I agree. One of
the paths at that crossroads is the extent to which the CRPD Committee’s
interpretations of the CRPD—that, on one level, would call for the abolition of all mental health law (and all status defenses in the criminal law,
including the insanity defense and incompetency status)8—will be taken
3

4

5

6
7

8

Importantly, although the United States has not ratified the CRPD, “a state’s obligations under it
are controlled by the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties[,] which requires signatories ‘to
refrain from acts which would defeat [the Disability Convention’s] object and purpose.”’ Henry A.
Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with Limited Competency in
Guardianship Proceedings, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 331, 362-63 (2011) (discussing
In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2010) (finding that guardianship
appointments must be subject to requirements of periodic reporting and review)).

See Michael L. Perlin & Eva
Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution and
Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: VISION, PRAXIS, AND COURAGE 80, 85
(Michael Dudley et al., eds. 2008); Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human
Rights: Evolution, Challenges and the Promise of the New Convention, in UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 241 (Jukka Kumpuvuori
& Martin Scheninen, eds. 2010); Michael L. Perlin, “A Change Is Gonna Come:” The Implications of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of
Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 484 (2009).
On how the medical model “is in direct violation” of the CRPD, see Michael L. Perlin, Promoting
Social Change in Asia and the Pacific: The Need for a Disability Rights Tribunal to Give Life to
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1,
14 (2012).
GOODING, at 47.
Id. at 254. Elsewhere, he says (and I again agree) that “mental health legislation faces an uncertain
future.” Id. at 21.
For my earlier critique of that position, see Michael L. Perlin, “God Said to Abraham/Kill Me
a Son”: Why the Insanity Defense and the Incompetency Status Are Compatible with and Required
by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Basic Principles of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477 (2017).
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(or should be taken) seriously by signatory nations.9 Here, he notes,
accurately, that “no government appears willing—at least at this stage—
to adhere to the directive” to do so.10 Another—and a significant portion
of the book is devoted to this—involves the unpacking the meaning and
significance of “supported decision-making” in the context of the
CRPD.11 Here, Gooding deftly analyzes the differences between traditional “substituted decision-making” (as reflected in the medical model)
and the contours of “supported decision-making” (as urged by the
CRPD), and he concludes—totally accurately, I believe—that the
CRPD’s “articulation of equality, autonomy, human dignity and solidarity
… provide a conceptual and practical alternative to existing legal configurations that emphasize ‘substituted decision-making,’”12 later—again
appropriately, I believe—relying on Oliver Lewis’s characterization of
the “expressive, educational and proactive” role of the CRPD.”13
Gooding asks and grapples with some of the hardest questions that
policymakers and advocates must face (and that most ignore): “How
should the law work when someone is unaware of the harm of her or his
actions? What should happen when a person wishes to jump off a building because she believes doing so will save the world?”14 Further, he
notes how the competing aims of mental health law “blur the decisionmaking process,”15 and I completely agree with that as well. In addition,
he calls attention to what I have previously described as the
“pretextuality” of much mental health law decision-making,16 quoting
an important critique of institutional psychiatry’s approach to civil
9

See, e.g., GOODING, at 61-68.
Id. at 65 (emphasis added). He notes elsewhere, and I agree, that current mental health legislation
provides poor protection for people with psychosocial disabilities “in the face of malign public
attitudes.” Id. at 97.
11
Id. at 117-217.
12
Id. at 5. Elsewhere, he notes, again accurately, that choice of language matters and that language
around mental health law is “greatly contested.” Id. at 35. This insight is one that also must be
taken seriously.
13
Id. at 68, citing Oliver Lewis, The Expressive, Educational and Proactive Roles of Human Rights: An
Analysis of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in RETHINKING
RIGHTS-BASED MENTAL HEALTH LAWS 97 (Bernadette McSherry & Penelope Weller eds., 2010).
14
Id. at 12. See also, id. at 39, his discussion of Bernadette McSherry’s focus—see Mental Health Law:
Where to from Here?” 40 MONASH U. L. REV. 175 (2014)—on the challenge that these issues pose.
15
GOODING, at 103. In an in-press article, I focus specifically on multiple aspects of this “blur.” See
Michael L. Perlin, Deborah A. Dorfman, & Naomi M. Weinstein, “On Desolation Row”: The
Blurring of the Borders between Civil and Criminal Mental Disability Law, and What It Means
for All of Us, TEX. J. ON CIV. LIBS. & CIV. RTS. (2018) (forthcoming), accessible at https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼3110985.
16
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of Ordinary Common
Sense, Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131
(1991); Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and
Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISS. 3 (1999).
10

58

BOOK REVIEW

commitment law: “They [institutional psychiatrists] learn what they
have to sign and complete in order to achieve what they have already
clinically decided on.”17 These questions and observations, and other
similar ones, give rise to a discussion of when, if ever, coercive
responses may be justified, and Gooding examines this dilemma
prudently and soberly.18
Gooding’s concluding recommendations are thoughtful and sober—
like the rest of the book. He calls for the active involvement of persons
with disabilities in implementing the CRPD19; for a human rights perspective to be integrated into all mental health law, policy, and practice; for the
legislative repeal of substituted decision-making processes20; and for a shift
in resources “from coercion to a wide range of supports in health and social
policy and programming.”21 And perhaps, most important, at every step of
the way, “the active involvement of people with psychosocial disabilities
and their supporters … will be crucial.”22 I could not agree more.
Two thoughts for Dr. Gooding’s potential future research agenda.
I am especially delighted that Dr. Gooding—and here he stands in contrast to many who write about mental disability law from an international
human rights law perspective—takes criminal law issues seriously.23
I hope that in a future work he tackles an issue that has concerned
me since the civil commitment abolition debate began in earnest in the
early- to mid-1970s. I have always feared that, were commitment to
17

18

19

20

21
22
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GOODING, at 113, quoting Tom Burns, Mental Illness is Different and Ignoring Its Differences
Profits Nobody, Special Issue, J. MENTAL HEALTH L. 34 (2010).
His discussion of the careful analysis by Oliver Lewis and Michael Bach of a draft Northern
Ireland Law; see How Northern Ireland Can Avoid Making a Big “Mental Capacity Law”
Mistake (April 23, 2014), accessible at www.mdac.info, is particularly insightful; see GOODING,
at 173–74.
Although the drafting of the CRPD stands alone in the extent to which disability rights
organizations were active participants in that drafting process—see HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY
ADVOCACY (Maya Sabatello & Marianne Schulze eds., 2014)—largely absent from that process
were forensic patients, perhaps the group most marginalized. See Maya Sabatello, Where Have
the Rights of Forensic Patients Gone?, 109 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 77, 78 (2015).
Importantly, the activism surrounding the drafting of the CRPD also inspired a number of new
disability rights organizations and alliances in regions of the world where such groups had not
previously been that active. See Carole J. Petersen, The Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities: Using International Law to Promote Social and Economic Development in the Asia
Pacific, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 821, 832 (2013).
GOODING, at 47-48; 255-56. This approach is elaborated upon in Theresia Degener & Gerard
Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative and Regional Disability Law Reform, in
DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW & POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 5, 14 (Mary Lou
Breslin & Silvia Yee eds., 2002).
GOODING, at 256.
Id. at 275.
See also, e.g., Piers Gooding & Tova Bennet, The Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Sweden
and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Human Rights
Brinksmanship or Evidence It Won’t Work? 21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 141 (2018).
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be abolished, many of the persons now subject to civil commitment
would be arrested for “nuisance crimes” (failing to give a good
account of themselves, loitering, etc.) and sent to jails, never a good
alternative for a person with a mental disability.24 The debate rages as
to whether deinstitutionalization is the “cause” of criminalization of
persons with mental illness,25 and this must be addressed frontally in
any conversation about the possible abolition of commitment laws (or
the abolition of forced treatment).
I am also concerned about another issue that somehow does not
emerge frequently enough: What sort of legal advocacy is available
for persons seeking to enforce the CRPD in domestic or regional
courts? This is also mostly beyond the scope of Dr. Gooding’s book,
but I think it is critical that, in the future, it be taken seriously by all
scholars and activists working on these issues. Several years ago,
I wrote this:
There is no question that the key to meaningful CRPD enforcement—and the
most critical determining factor of whether the CRPD will actually be as
emancipatory as its potential suggests (and as some literature predicts)—is the
availability and presence of dedicated and committed counsel to provide
representation to the population in question. Without the presence of vigorous,
advocacy-focused counsel, the CRPD may turn into little more than a “paper
victory” for persons with disabilities and their advocates.26

24

25

26

I discuss this in parallel situations in, inter alia, Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Had to be
Held Down by Big Police”: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective on Interactions between
Police and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 43 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 685 (2016); Michael L.
Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “To Wander Off in Shame”: Deconstructing the Shaming and Shameful
Arrest Policies of Urban Police Departments in Their Treatment of Persons with Mental
Disabilities, in SYSTEMIC HUMILIATION IN AMERICA: FINDING DIGNITY WITHIN SYSTEMS OF DEGRADATION
175 (Daniel Rothbart ed. 2018); Naomi M. Weinstein & Michael L. Perlin, “Who’s Pretending to
Care for Him?” How the Endless Jail-to-Hospital-to-Street-Repeat Cycle Deprives Persons with
Mental Disabilities the Right to Continuity of Care, 8 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 455, 45657 (2018).
I do not believe that it is; see Michael L. Perlin, “Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail”: Using
Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17
MICH. ST. U. J.L. & MED. 343, 349-53 (2013), relying on, inter alia, Jennifer L. Skeem et al.,
Correctional Policy for Offenders with Mental Illness: Creating a New Paradigm for Recidivism
Reduction, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 110 (2011), and John Junginger et al., Effects of Serious Mental
Illness and Substance Abuse on Criminal Offenses, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 879 (2006), but this
causal connection is clearly in the public favor.
Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”: The Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1159,
1179-80 (2013). Gooding does note my argument that comprehensive mental health legislation can
ensure that individuals “can access independent counsel and judicial review mechanisms.” GOODING, at
85, citing Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental Disability
Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COMMERCE 333, 343 (2007).
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I am sad that there has been so little attention paid to this topic and
am hoping that, in the future, Dr. Gooding takes this on as well. It is a
topic that would greatly benefit from his analytic skills and compassion
(a pairing all too rare in the literature).27
So, in short, this is an excellent book on an important topic.
Dr. Gooding has done us all a favor by devoting his time and energy to
it. I hope that it is widely read.

ORCID
Michael L. Perlin
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http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1260-0359

Although therapeutic jurisprudence is barely mentioned in the book (and that in citations to
articles, see his thoughtful discussion, GOODING, at 75, of Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of
Incompetency Labeling and the Implications for Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
6, (1995)), the book resounds with therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) implications for scholars,
practitioners, and activists. I have said elsewhere that “the CRPD is a document that resonates
with TJ values”; see Perlin, supra note 5, at 36, and that, in this context, one “of the major aims
of TJ is explicitly the empowerment of those whose lives are regulated by the legal system.” Id.;
see also Michael L. Perlin, “Your Old Road Is/Rapidly Agin’”: International Human Rights
Standards and Their Impact on Forensic Psychologists, the Practice of Forensic Psychology, and
the Conditions of Institutionalization of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUDIES L. REV. 79, 106 (2018) (“the application of international human rights law
… —specifically, the CRPD—is entirely consonant with TJ values”). I hope that Dr. Gooding’s
book is carefully read by TJ scholars and practitioners as well.

